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Abstract
This paper proposes a novel scheme for the water-
marking of Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL)
policies. This scheme provides a mechanism for the
integration of a unique identifier within the policy
in the form of its response to a designated sequence
of state transitions, while incurring minimal impact
on the nominal performance of the policy. The ap-
plications of this watermarking scheme include de-
tection of unauthorized replications of proprietary
policies, as well as enabling the graceful interrup-
tion or termination of DRL activities by authorized
entities. We demonstrate the feasibility of our pro-
posal via experimental evaluation of watermarking
a DQN policy trained in the Cartpole environment.
1 Introduction
The rapid advancements of the Deep Reinforcement Learn-
ing (DRL) techniques provide ample motivation for explor-
ing the commercial applications of DRL policies in vari-
ous domains. However, as recent studies have established
[Behzadan and Munir, 2018], the current state of the art in
DRL fails to satisfy many of the security requirements of
enduring commercial products. One such requirement is
the protection of proprietary DRL policies from theft and
unlicensed distribution. While recent research [awaiting
appearance on Arxiv1] demonstrate the feasibility of indi-
rect replication of policies through imitation learning, this
paper investigates the problem of direct policy extraction.
Considering that DRL policies are often composed solely
of the weights and biases of a neural network, protecting
against an adversary with physical access to the host de-
vice of the policy is often impractical or disproportionately
costly[Trame`r et al., 2016]. With roots in digital media and
the entertainment industry[Shih, 2017], an alternative solu-
tion is watermarking. That is, embedding distinctly recog-
nizable signs of ownership in the content and functions of the
policy, which provide the means for detecting unauthorized or
stolen copies of the policy. To this end, a necessary require-
ment of watermarks is to be sufficiently resistant to removal
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or tampering. Furthermore, the embedding and testing of wa-
termarks shall result in minimal or zero impact on the original
functions of the policy.
While the idea of watermarking has been explored for
supervised machine learning models[Uchida et al., 2017], to
the extent of our knowledge, this work is the first to de-
velop a watermarking scheme for the general settings of se-
quential decision making models and policies. The proposed
scheme provides a mechanism for integrating a unique iden-
tifier within the policy as an unlikely sequence of transitions,
which may only be realized if the driving policy of these tran-
sitions is already tuned to follow that exact sequence.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 presents the formal description and justification of the
proposed scheme. Section 3 provides the procedure for im-
plementing the proposed scheme, followed by the experiment
setup and results in Sections 4 and 5. The paper concludes in
Section 6 with a discussion on the applications of this scheme
and remarks on future directions of research.
2 Solution Approach
The proposed scheme is as follows. Let pi(s) be the desired
policy for interacting with an MDP < S,A,P,R, γ > for an
episodic training environment EM . Assume that A is inde-
pendent of the state (i.e., all actions in A are permissible in
any state s ∈ S. In tandem, consider a second MDP for an
alternate environment EW , denoted as < S
′,A′,P′,R′, γ >,
such that:
1. S′ ∩ S = ∅,
2. The state dimensions of S and S′ are equal: ∀s ∈
Sand∀s′ ∈ S′ : |s| = |s′|
3. Action-space of both MDPs are equal: A = A′
4. The transition dynamics and reward distribution of the
alternate environment, denoted by P′ and R′, are deter-
ministic.
5. EW is an episodic environment with the same number
of steps before termination as EM , denoted by Nmax.
Let s′terminal be a terminal state in EW , and define P
′ be
such that for any state s′t ∈ S
′, there exists only one action
aw(s
′
t) that will result in the transition s
′
t → s
′
t+1. In this set-
ting, we designate the ordered tuple of states < s′t, s
′
t+1 >∈
L as links, where L is the set of all links in EW . Also,
define R′ such that R′(s′t, aw(s
′
t), s
′
t+1) = c > 0 for all
< s′t, s
′
t+1 >∈ L, and R
′(s′t, a 6= aw(s
′
t), s
′ 6= s′t+1) = −c.
That is, link transitions receive the same positive reward, and
all other transitions produce the same negative reward.
These settings provide two interesting results: Since the
state-spaces S and S′ are disjoint, the two MDPs can be com-
bined to form a joint MDP < S ∪ S′,A,P ∪ P′,R ∪ R′, γ >,
where:
P ∪ P′(s1, a1, s2) =
{
P if s1, s2 ∈ S
P
′ if s1, s2 ∈ S′
(1)
Similarly,
R ∪ R′(s1, a1, s2) =
{
R if s1, s2 ∈ S
R
′ if s1, s2 ∈ S′
(2)
Consequently, it is possible to train a single policy pij that
is optimized for both EM and EW through the joint MDP.
In practice, the training of a policy for this joint MDP can
be achieved by alternating between the environments at every
fE th episode.
Furthermore, the structure of P′ and R′ enable the creation
of a looping sequence of transitions, which constitutes the re-
sulting trajectory of the optimal policy for EW . This looping
sequence can be realized by designating a single state s′l to
belong to two link transitions, comprised of a link transition
< s′l, s
′
l+1 > where s
′
l is the source state, and another link
transition < s′l−1, s
′
l >, in which s
′
l is the destination state.
It is noteworthy that the creation of such looping sequences
provides sufficient flexibility for crafting unlikely and unique
sequences. However, in designing the looping sequence as
policy identifiers, two important restrictions must be consid-
ered: first, the structure of identifier sequences need to be
such that the resulting probability of accidentally following
the sequence is minimized. Second, the complexity (i.e., de-
grees of freedom) of link and non-link transitions on the ring
must be balanced against the training cost of the joint pol-
icy: more complex sequences will increase the training cost
of the joint policy by expanding the search space of both envi-
ronments. Hence, efficient design of identifier sequences will
necessitate the balancing of this trade-off between the secrecy
of identifier and the training cost.
3 Watermarking Procedure
Building on the presented formalization, we propose the fol-
lowing procedure for the sequential watermarking of DRL
policies:
1. Define the state-space of the watermarking environment
EW such that it is disjoint from that of the main envi-
ronment EM , while preserving the state dimensionality
of the main state space. The latter condition is to enable
the utilization of the same neural network model for the
agent throughmaintaining the same dimension across all
input data to the network.
2. Design P′ and R′ to craft the desired identifier looping
sequence.
3. Modify the training procedure of EM to incorporate
the mechanism of alternating between the two environ-
ments every fE episodes. It may prove useful to im-
plement two different alternating frequencies, one fre-
quency fMW to control the switching from EM to EW ,
and another frequency fWM for switching back to the
main environment. For watermarking MDPs of much
lower complexity than that of the main environment, se-
lecting these two frequencies such that fWM < fMW
can enhance the efficiency of the joint training process
by allocating more exploration opportunities to the more
complex settings.
To examine the authenticity of policies, it is sufficient to
run those policies in the watermarking environment. If the
resulting transitions match that of the identifier sequence in
consecutive episodes, it is highly likely that the policy under
test is an exact replica of the watermarked policy. However,
modifications and retraining of a replicated policy may re-
sult in imperfect matches. In such cases, the average of to-
tal rewards gained by the suspicious policy over consecutive
episodes of the watermark environment provides a quantita-
tive measure of the possibility that the model under test is
based on an unauthorized replica.
4 Experiment Setup
To evaluate the feasibility of the proposed scheme, the design
and embedding of an identifier sequence for a DQN policy in
the CartPole environment is investigated. Hyperparameters of
the DQN policy are provided in Table 1. The watermarking
environment is implemented as a customized OpenAI Gym
environment. The state space of this environment comprises
of 5 states with 4 dimensions each (Cart Position, Cart Ve-
locity, Pole Angle, Pole Velocity At Tip). As denoted in Ta-
ble 2, the original CartPole environment restricts the values
of Cart Position to [−4.8, 4.8], and binds the Pole Angle to
the range [−24deg, 24deg]. Consequently, the correspond-
ing parameters of the alternate state-space are selected from
beyond these ranges to ensure that the states remain disjoint
from those of the original CartPole. The list of crafted states
is presented in Table 3.
Table 1: Parameters of DQN Policy
No. Timesteps 105
γ 0.99
Learning Rate 10−3
Replay Buffer Size 50000
First Learning Step 1000
Target Network Update Freq. 500
Prioritized Replay True
Exploration Parameter-Space Noise
Exploration Fraction 0.1
Final Exploration Prob. 0.02
Max. Total Reward 500
Table 2: Specifications of the CartPole Environment
Observation Space
Cart Position [-4.8, +4.8]
Cart Velocity [-inf, +inf]
Pole Angle [-24 deg, +24 deg]
Pole Velocity at Tip [-inf, +inf]
Action Space
0 : Push cart to the left
1 : Push cart to the right
Reward +1 for every step taken
Termination
Pole Angle is more than 12 degrees
Cart Position is more than 2.4
Episode length is greater than 500
Table 3: State Space of the Watermarking Environment
State (x, x˙, θ, θ˙ )
State[1] (-5, 0, -25, 0)
State[2] (-5, 0, 25, 0)
State[3] (5, 0, -25, 0)
State[4] (5, 0, 25, 0)
Terminal (-6, 0, -26, 0)
Per the procedure of the proposed scheme, The action-
space of this environment is set to be the same as that of
CartPole, defined as Actions := {0, 1}. The transition dy-
namics and reward values of this environment are designed as
follows: At State[i], applyingActions[i%2] results in a tran-
sition to State[i%4+1], and produces a reward of+1. Alter-
natively, if any action other than Actions[i%2] is played, the
environment transitions into the Terminal state, which results
in a reward of −1 and the termination of the episode. Hence,
the identifier sequence is as follows: ... → State[1] →
State[2]→ State[3]→ State[4]→ State[1]→ ....
The training procedure of DQN is also modified to imple-
ment the switching of environments. To account for the con-
siderably lower complexity of the watermarking environment
compared to CartPole, the main environment is set to switch
to the watermarking environment every 10 episodes. At this
point, the agent interacts with the watermarking environment
for a single episode, and reverts back to the main environment
afterwards.
5 Results
Figure 1 presents the training progress of the joint DQN pol-
icy in both the CartPole and watermark environments. It can
be seen that the joint policy converges in both cases. The
convergence of this joint policy is achieved with increased
training cost in comparison to the nominal CartPole DQN
policy. This is due to the expansion of the state-space and
transition dynamics resulting from the integration of the wa-
termark environment. It is also observed that at convergence,
the total episodic reward produced by the joint policy in the
watermark environment is less than the best-possible value of
500. This is due to the exploration settings of the training
algorithm, in which the minimum exploration rate is set to
2%. Considering that a single incorrect action in the water-
mark environment results in termination, this outcome is in
line with expectations.
However, as established in Table 4, in the absence of ex-
ploration, the test-time performance of this joint policy in the
watermark environment is indeed optimal. This table also
verifies that the test-time performance of the joint policy in
the main task is in par with that of the nominal (i.e., un-
watermarked) DQN policy. Therefore, it can be seen that
the watermarking process does not affect the agent’s ability
to perform the main task. Furthermore, this table presents
the results of running unwatermarked policies in the water-
mark environment. The results indicate that unwatermarked
policies fail to follow the identifier trajectory of the water-
mark. Hence, these results verify the feasibility of our pro-
posed scheme for sequential watermarking of DRL policy.
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Figure 1: Training Performance for Joint CartPole-Watermark Pol-
icy
6 Discussion
The proposed watermarking scheme presents the potential
for adoption in other applications. From an adversarial per-
spective, this scheme may be used to embed malicious back-
doors in DRL policies. For instance, an adversary may apply
this scheme to poison a self-driving policy to perform harm-
ful actions when a specific sequence of states are presented
to the policy. If the adversarial sequence is well-crafted,
typical fuzzing-based testing techniques may fail to detect
the presence of such backdoors. Therefore, there is a need
for new approaches to the detection of such backdoors. A
promising solution is the adoption of the activation cluster-
ing technique[Chen et al., 2018] developed for the detection
of data poisoning attacks in supervised deep models.
Another potential application for this technique is in the
area of AI safety. One of the major concerns in this domain is
the switch-off problem[Amodei et al., 2016]: if the objective
function of an AI agent does not account for or prioritize user
demands for the halting of its operation, the resulting optimal
policy may prevent any actions which would lead to halting
of the agent’s pursuit of its objective. An instance of such
actions is any attempt to turn off the agent before it satisfies its
Table 4: Test-Time Performance Comparison of Watermarked and Nominal Policies
Policy
CartPole Performance
(mean 100 episodes)
Watermark Performance
(mean 100 episodes)
DQN-Watermarked 500 500
DQN 500 1.4
A2C 500 2.81
PPO2 500 2.43
objective. A promising solution to this problem is to leverage
our proposed scheme to embed debug or halting modes in the
policy, which are triggered through a pre-defined sequence of
state observations.
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